SIPRI – Last week Beijing hosted the postponed fourth ‘Heart of Asia’ ministerial conference in the framework of the Istanbul Process. Inaugurated in 2011, the Process is unique as it is the only multilateral vehicle led by Afghanistan, thus permitting the country a greater say in its own affairs. Its objective is to facilitate Afghanistan’s reconstruction through interregional collaboration. To this end and in a short period of time, the Process has successfully managed to commit 14 participating members, some of which previously had difficulty coming together, to cooperate.

However, the Process is beset by a number of internal and external challenges that necessitate attention. Newly elected Afghan president Ashraf Ghani and his administration will have to designate ample human resources and diplomacy efforts to guarantee the process’ effectiveness and sustainability.

An outer circle of 28 supporting members (mostly traditional donors to Afghanistan’s reconstruction) buttresses the inner circle of participating members. Through this process, members have created six confidence-building measures (CBMs) to instil trust and cooperation among members of the inner circle to support the planning, coordination and implementation of their work.

Arguably the sheer number of members involved in the process dilutes its effectiveness. The Beijing ministerial conference, somewhat overshadowed by Ghani’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, was no exception. While a number of action plans were discussed they were foremost the product of China’s efforts within the Process.

In its wake, the most recent ministerial conference has again left other participating members wondering in what way the Istanbul Process benefits them. Such concerns have been amplified by the notable diminished ranking of delegation officials attending the inner circle’s last two ministerial conferences in Beijing and Almaty, respectively; it is no longer the case that states send the top ranking representation to the conference.

Despite their concerns, participating members share some of the blame for the limitations of the process thus far. A number of the larger geopolitical powers in the inner circle have prevented further institutionalization of the process to safeguard the sway of established multilateral fora. This has led to a lack of funds for core Istanbul Process coordination. While outer-circle states could largely fund the Process, they prefer not to overstep the mark.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s capacity to coordinate a multilateral process of 42 members has also been subject to scrutiny. Former Afghan deputy minister Jawed Ludin and Turkey (the co-initiator of the Process) were energetic drivers of the Process. But Ludin has left public service, and Turkey has deprioritized Afghanistan as a result of domestic and regional developments. This has created a power vacuum within the Process that has so far proven hard to fill. These issues are all exacerbated by hampered internal support for the Process: the Regional Cooperation Directorate (RCD), a small and understaffed office at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs that already has to juggle a series of commitments, runs the process.

Ghani’s administration will have to foster the process by underlining the need for more funding to members and by designating a sizable and diplomatically seasoned team to coordinate it. This team would have to be more proactive in signalling to members the precise needs of Afghanistan and to focus on projects with more immediate and tangible impact to cater to members’ expectations. In support of this, Afghanistan could also consider to downsize the number of CBMs: the process covers too much ground. It is better to do few things well, than many things half-baked.

About the author
Richard Ghiasy (Netherlands, Afghanistan) is a Researcher with the SIPRI project on Afghanistan’s economic development and regional integration.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.